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ACCRUAL ACCOUNTING
TAX ACCRUAL ACCOUNTING FOR CONTESTED ITEMS
(Without the Benefit of LR.C. sections 452 and 462)
Harrop A. Freemant
A SPATE of cases in 1956-1957* has required us to examine
again the tax handling of accrual accounting in an attempt
to find some way through the judicial morass. This study is con-
cerned primarily with proper income and expense accrual report-
ing in cases in which some form of controversy exists or may exist
between the taxpayer and another party concerning the item to
be accrued.
General Principles
It is frequently recognized that tax accounting does not have
to coincide with business accounting.' Nevertheless the Internal
Revenue Code depends on concepts of "cash" and "accrual,"
and it accepts the "method of accounting on the basis of which the
taxpayer regularly computes his income in keeping his books,"
subject only to the power of the Internal Revenue Service to sub-
stitute another method "if the method used does not clearly re-
flect income." 2 Tax decisions must, therefore, incorporate as much
sound accounting as possible. Departure from accounting prin-
ciples should be the exception rather than the rule.'
The recognized purpose of accrual accounting is to determine
income properly by matching appropriate costs against the related
earning process. This requires reporting reasonable expectations
*-Professor of Law, Cornell University.-Ed.
*See Appendix, p. 748 infra.
1 See Commissioner v. Wheeler, 324 U.S. 542 at 546 (1945); Commissioner v. Phipps,
836 U.S. 410 (1949); Putnam v. United States, (1st Cir. 1945) 149 F. (2d) 721; 1 MERTENS,
LAW OF FEERmA INCOME TAXATION §9.83 (1942); "Accounting Principles and Taxable In-
come," 27 ACCOUNTING izv. 427 (1952); Reimer, "Major Differences Between Net Income
for Accounting Purposes and for Federal Income Taxes," 23 ACCOUNTING REV. 305 (1948);
Lasser and Peloubet, "Tax Accounting v. Commercial Accounting," 4 TAx L. REV. 348
(1949); Wemntz, "The Influence of Changing Tax Rates on Accounting and Auditing
Procedures," 28 TAxEs 658 (1950).
"In an ideal system of accounting, net income would be determined by deducting
from gross income the expenses actually incurred in earning the gross. It is frequently
impossible or impracticable to do this precisely in practice. Nevertheless, the Government
must have its revenues even at the expense of some niceties of accounting." Bradstreet
Co. of Maine, 23 B.T.A. 1093 at 1102-1103 (1931).
2 l.R.C., §446.
3 AMERICAN ACCOUNTING AssOCIATION, ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING STANDARDS FOR
CORPORATE FINANCIAL STATEMENTS, 1957 revision.
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of both revenues and costs. 4 Even in tax accounting, where the
yearly demand of a tax is controlling, the usual statement is that
income is reported when earned and deductions are allowed in
the year incurred.5 It is well known that prior to 1916 the only
method of accounting acceptable for tax reporting was the cash
method.6 The accrual and hybrid methods were approved by
the Revenue Act of 1916 and subsequent statutes, and the Treas-
ury Department wrote generally-accepted accrual accounting in-
to its original interpretative Treasury Decision.7 Thus it would
appear that the Supreme Court was right in stating: "We think
that the statute was correctly interpreted by the Commission-
er. . . ." Recently the legislative intent to bring tax law into
harmony with accepted accounting principles has been clear,
and this in spite of the necessity for repealing sections 452 and
462 of the Internal Revenue Code. The proposed regulations un-
der the 1954 code, though cautious, have tried to develop such
harmony.'
4 SHANNON, LEGAL ACCOUNTING 162 (1951); PATON, ACCOUNTANTS' HANDBOOK 113 (1950);
FINNEY AND OLDBERG, LAWYER'S GUIDE TO ACCOUNTING 78 (1955); KArz, ACCOUNTING 43
(1954); KEsTER, ADvANcED ACCOUNTING 415 (1946); Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193 (1934);
United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422 at 440 (1926): "The appellee's true income for
the year 1916 could not have been determined without deducting from its gross income
for the year the total cost and expenses attributable to the production of that income
during the year." AmERiCAN INSTITUTE OF ACCOUNTANTS, ACCOUNrING RESEARCH BULLEN
No. 43, p. 9 (1953): " . . the burden of justifying departure from accepted procedures,
to the extent that they are evidenced in committee opinions, must be assumed by those
who adopt another treatment." See also editorial, 79 J. ACCOUNTANCY 90 (1945): ". . . it
is a brave man in the accounting profession who is willing to take on the task of
justifying a disregard of the releases."
5CCH 1956 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 2820.025; United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S.
422 at 437, 442 (1926). See words "paid or accrued" and "paid or incurred" in statutes
and regulations since 1916. Revenue Act of 1918, §§200-234, 40 Stat. 1058; 2 MAY, TWENTY-
FIVE YEARS OF ACCOUNTING REsPONSIBLTY 267-285 (1936).
6 Revenue Act of 1916, §13(d), 39 Stat. 771; Maryland Casualty Co. v. United States,
251 U.S. 342 (1920); Treas. Reg. 81, arts. 1-5 (1909); Treas. Reg. 33, art. 100ff. (1913).
7 T.D. 243, 19 TrEAs. ]DEC. INT. REv. 5-6 (1917): ". . . it will be permissible for
corporations which accrue on their books monthly or at other stated periods amounts
sufficient to meet fixed annual or other charges to deduct from their gross income the
amounts so accrued, provided such accruals approximate as nearly as possible the actual
liabilities for which the accruals are made .. " This is quite apart from the question
whether the above statute, regulations and decisions now control as to "reserves" since
the 1916 act was the only one (except for I.R.C. 1954 §§452 and 462 now repealed) specifi-
cally to allow reserve. See Reiling, "Practical Legal Aspects of Tax Accounting," 30
TAxES 1028 (1952); 2 MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAXES, CORPORATIONS AND PARTNERsms 406
(1950-1951).
8 United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422 at 438 (1926).
9 Treas. Reg. 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii): "Generally, under an accrual method, income is to be
included for the taxable year when all the events have occurred which fix the right to
receive such income and the amount thereof can be determined with reasonable accuracy.
Under such a method, deductions are allowable for the taxable year in which all the
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It is, therefore, rather surprising that we continue to have
so much difficulty in fitting correct accounting principles into
our tax decisions. At the end of this article is an Appendix list-
ing some forty cases decided within the past year in which the
court was in some way involved in this confusion.
The analysis in this article depends largely on the following
new decisions: Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner,0
Irwin v. Commissioner,:1 Schuessler v. Commissioner,12 and Cold
Metal Process Co. v. Commissioner.3 The reader may draw on
the Appendix for further illustrations. Older cases will be dis-
cussed merely to show the derivation of rules or the degree to
which a more realistic approach was attempted. The section on
the all-events test traces in detail the Supreme Court cases, but
otherwise builds on the article by Alfred Holland, "Accrual Prob-
lems in Tax Accounting," which appeared in this Review in
1949.14 There is already a quantity of excellent law review
events have occurred which establish the fact of -the liability giving rise to such deduction
and the amount thereof can be determined with reasonable accuracy. The method used
by the taxpayer in determining when income is to be accounted for will be acceptable
if it accords with generally recognized and accepted income tax accounting principles
and is consistently used by the taxpayer from year to year. For example, a taxpayer
engaged in a manufacturing business may account for sales of his product when the
goods are shipped, when the product is delivered or accepted, or when title to the goods
passes to the customer, whether or not billed, depending upon the method regularly
employed in keeping his books...." Treas. Reg. 1.451-1(a). See the same words as
above, and "Where an amount of income is properly accrued on the basis of a reasonable
estimate and -the exact amount is subsequently determined, the difference, if any, shall
be taken into account for the taxable year in which such determination is made."
S. Rep. 372, 84th Cong., 1st sess., 6 (1955): ". . your committee believes that it is
essential that the income tax laws be brought into harmony with generally accepted
accounting principles." [After approving Beacon Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, (10th
Cir. 1955) 218 F. (2d) 697 and Pacific Grape Products Co. v. Commissioner, (9th Cir.
1955) 219 F. (2d) 862, the committee added: "An extension of the principles laid down
in this case might well lead the courts in the future to permit the accrual of most
estimated expenses which would be covered by section 462 even though this section is
repealed."] S. Rep. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d sess., 62 (1954): "The changes embodied in
-the . . . bill are designed to bring the income-tax provisions of the law into, harmony
with generally accepted accounting principles .. " See also H. Hearings on General
Revenue Revision Before the Committee on Ways and Means, 83d Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 2,
pp. 575-610 (1954); S. Hearings on the I.R.C. of 1954, Committee on Finance, 83d Cong.,
2d sess. (1954); H. Rep. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d sess. (1954); S. Rep. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d
sess. (1954). It was long recognized that the difficulty lay, not with the statute, but with
administrative and court interpretation, MoNTooMERY, Fxnwm. TAX HANDBOOK (all edi-
tions), but see 1940 edition, Vol. 1, p. 833.
10 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
11 (3d Cir. 1956) 238 F. (2d) 874.
12 (5th Cir. 1956) 230 F. (2d) 722.
18 (6th Cir. 1957) 247 F. (2d) 864. Cf. Rev. Rul. 57-105, 1957 INT. REV. Bur. No. 11,
p. 31.
1448 MiCH. L. R.y. 149 (1949).
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material on accrual accounting; a partial list of the more recent
articles appears in the footnote.15
"Claim of Right" and Its Relation to Accrual
It is generally recognized that the "claim of right" concept
was introduced into the law-much as was the "constructive re-
ceipt" theory-to tax a cash basis taxpayer with the receipt of
amounts which might be under litigation or which he might
later have to repay.16 It was intended to determine whether an
item was taxable, not when. The application of the doctrine to
accrual taxpayers developed almost entirely from opinions of
Judge Rice in the Tax Court,'17 and these opinions were usually
reversed when they came before the courts of appeals.' Most
law review articles commended refusals to apply the claim of
right test.' 9 In Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner0
membership dues paid yearly were deposited in the Auto Club's
general bank account and an offsetting liability account, "Un-
15 Holland, "Accrual Problems in Tax Accounting," 48 Mica. L. Rlv. 149 (1949);
Bowe, "Cash and Accrual Methods of Income Tax Accounting," 3 VAND. L. Rav. 60
(1949); Lasser and Peloubet, "Tax Accounting v. Commercial Accounting," 4 TAX L. REV.
843 (1949); Werntz, "The Influence of Changing Tax Rates on Accounting and Auditing
Procedures," 28 TAXEs 658 (1950); Income Tax-Accrual Accounting in Taxation, 1955
UNIV. Ir.. L. FORUM 163; Boughner, "Accounting for Items in Dispute," 30 TAXEs 1038
(1952); "Accounting Principles and Taxable Income," 27 AccOuNING Rlv. 427 (1952);
"Accrual: The Uncertain Concept of Certainty-A History of the All Events Test," 21
UNIv. CH. L. RFv. 293 (1954); Gelfand, "The 'Claim of Right Doctrine,"' 33 TAXES 726
(1955); Wagman, "Sections 452 and 462: Stormy Past But a Bright Tomorrow," 33 TAXES
711 (1955); Heffern, "Claim-of-Right and Other Tax Doctrines Are Distorting Proper
Accounting," 5 J. Taxation 20 (1956); "Taxation-The 'Claim of Right' Doctrine vs.
Accrual Accounting," 9 A.A. L. Rav. 143 (1956); Sporrer, "The Past and Future of Defer-
ring Income and Reserving for Expenses," 34 TAXES 45 (1956); Wolder, "Deduction of
Reserves for Future Expenses and Deferring of Prepaid Income," 34 TAXES 524 (1956);
"Income Tax-Accrual Accounting for Prepaid Income and Estimated Expenses," 17 LA.
L. REv. 628 (1957).
16 N. American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417 at 424 (1932): "If a taxpayer
receives earnings under a claim of right and without restriction as to its disposition, he
has received income which -he is required to return, even though it may still be claimed
that he is not entitled to retain the money, and even though he may still be adjudged
liable to restore its equivalent." See also United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951);
Healy v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 278 (1953); Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952).
17Wallace A. Moritz, 21 T.C. 622 (1954); Beacon Publishing Co., 21 T.C. 610 (1954);
Curtis R. Andrews, 23 T.C. 1026 (1955); E. W. Schuessler, 24 T.C. 247 (1955). The Moritz
and Andrews cases were not appealed.
18 The Beacon and Schuessler cases were both reversed. Beacon Publishing Co. v.
Commissioner, (10th Cir. 1955) 218 F. (2d) 697, and Schuessler v. Commissioner, (5th
Cir. 1956) 230 F. (2d) 722.
19See, for example, Heffern, "Claim-of-lRight and Other Tax Doctrines Are Dis-
torting Proper Accounting," 5 J. TAXATiON 20 (1956); "Taxation-The 'Claim of Right'
Doctrine vs. Accrual Accounting," 9 ALA. L. R v. 143 (1956).
20353 U.S. 180 (1957).
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earned Membership Dues," was credited. Each month one-twelfth
of the dues were transferred to a "Membership Income" account,
which thus became a part of the yearly reported income. The
majority of the Supreme Court, relying both on the "claim of
right" theory and on the conclusion that the method of monthly
allocation was "purely artificial," required the total accrual when
the amounts were received. The dissent denied that "claim of
right" had any legitimate application and that the Commissioner
could depart from the taxpayer's method of accounting, unless
he found (which he could not) that "'the method employed does
not clearly reflect' the taxpayer's income."
The Automobile Club of Michigan case may seem at first to
add confusion to an already confused area." In the Andrews
case22 the Tax Court noted that its dilemma was between decid-
ing contrary to sound accounting or contrary to the "firmly es-
tablished 'claim of right' doctrine." If in the Automobile Club
of Michigan case the Supreme Court has chosen the claim of
right rule in preference to sound accrual accounting, then the
case is to be lamented. But it is possible that the Supreme Court
did not go this far. First, it may be saying that income must be
reported as soon as received, even by an accrual taxpayer, but
that he may be entitled to an offsetting expense accrual un-
less it "is purely artificial and bears no relation to the services
which petitioner may in fact be called upon to render ... "3
Second, by citing the Beacon and Schuessler cases24 as distinguish-
able, while refusing to comment on their correctness, the Court
seems to have recognized the right to accrue an offsetting expense
for real services to be performed at specified later times. Third,
it may have rested its decision on the discretionary power of the
Commissioner to determine that the taxpayer's accounts did not
"clearly reflect the income" for tax purposes. It is to be hoped
that this third basis will not be pressed, if it is to hold that the
I.R.C. thus divorces tax and business accounting.
If we revert to the two previous Supreme Court cases which
have some similarity to the Automobile Club of Michigan case,
we may be able to determine the likely application of the hold-
ing. In North American Oil Consolidated v. Burnet25 a receiver
21S. Rep. 372, 84th Cong., 1st sess., 6 (1955).
22 Curtis R. Andrews, 23 T.C. 1026 (1955).
23 Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 at 189 (1957).
24 (10th Cir. 1955) 218 F. (2d) 697, and (5th Cir. 1956) 230 F. (2d) 722.
25286 U.S. 417 (1932).
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was appointed to operate property pending the outcome of a
lawsuit contesting the taxpayer's title. Income from the receiver's
1916 operation was turned over to the taxpayer in 1917, when a
decree favorable to the taxpayer was entered. But the litigation
was not finally determined until 1922 when the appeal was dis-
missed. The Court held the income must be accrued in 1917
when the taxpayer obtained unrestricted use of the money and
his "right" had substance. It could not be accrued in 1916 be-
cause no right to income was certain. It could not be deferred
by someone else's continued litigation after taxpayer had the in-
come. Two years later in Brown v. Helvering,26 the Court held
that commissions received by an accrual taxpayer must be in-
cluded in taxable income in the year he received them in cash,
though they might not be earned until later years or might have
to be refunded on cancellation of the policies. The obligation to
refund was deemed too uncertain and contingent to accrue as an
offsetting liability. Several cases, though involving cash basis tax-
payers, use language applicable to accrual as well and establish
the claim of right doctrine as "deeply rooted in the federal tax
system.1
2 7
In short, it is probable that these cases engraft the "claim of
right" doctrine onto accrual accounting. But they still allow
offsetting obligation accruals which are real and reasonably ascer-
tainable, and they do not make accrual or non-accrual depend on
continued litigation by someone other than the taxpayer. We
can probably live with the claim of right doctrine if realistic ac-
crual accounting for offsetting obligations is permitted and if
the litigiousness of others than the taxpayer is not allowed to
control the taxpayer's books. Otherwise, the cases would seem to
require that income be reported on the "cash" basis and deduc-
tions on the "accrual" basis, which would incur the condemnation
expressed elsewhere by the Court, that such a system did not
clearly reflect income.2"
The "All-Events" Test
I have come to the conclusion that a sharp distinction must be
made between the Supreme Court decisions stating the all-events
26291 U.S. 193 (1934).
27 United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 at 592 (1951); Rutkin v. United States, 343
U.S. 130 (1952); Healy v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 278 at 281 (1953).
28 Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496 (1948).
732 [ Vol. 56
ACCRUAL ACCOUNTING
test and the application of that test by lower courts. It appears
from the actual Supreme Court decisions that they do not stand
in the way of proper accrual accounting, but may even further it.
On the other hand, especially in the area of disputed items to
which we are giving our attention, the lower court cases are con-
fusing, illogical and unsound accounting-wise. Each Supreme
Court case will be analyzed but the lower court cases will only be
grouped and characterized.
It is generally recognized that the father of the "all-events"
test was United States v. Anderson."' In that case an accrual tax-
payer attempted to deduct munitions taxes with regard to 1916
income in 1917, when they were assessed after the 1916 net in-
come became known, rather than in 1916 when he had first set up
a reserve for these taxes. The all-events test was stated precisely
to prevent litigation and other asserted legal niceties from interfer-
ing with sound accrual accounting: ". . . appellee's true income for
the year 1916 could not have been determined without deducting
from its gross income for the year the total cost and expenses
attributable to the production of that income during the year."30
It then met the taxpayer's attempt to distort accounting concepts
by saying:
"In a technical legal sense it may be argued that a tax does
not accrue until it has been assessed and becomes due; but it
is also true that in advance of the assessment of a tax, all the
events may occur which fix the amount of the tax and deter-
mine the liability of the taxpayer to pay it .... In the eco-
nomic and bookkeeping sense with which the statute and
Treasury decision [T.D. 2433] were concerned, the taxes had
accrued."'"
In American National Co. v. United States32 the taxpayer
negotiated five-year loans for investors. Its compensation was a
percentage of the loan. The investors received four percent yearly
from the debtor and were to get one percent additional each year
from the taxpayer unless the loan was repaid in less than five years.
American National accrued the whole five year one percent bonus
and was allowed this deduction in the year of loan negotiation.
Again the opinion was based on the accounting concept of match-
29269 U.S. 422 (1926).
30Id. at 440.
31 Id. at 441. See also Fawcus Machine Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 375 (1931).
82274 U.S. 99 (1927).
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ing income and expense items; the contingencies of repayment
were deemed too remote to prevent accrual. Lucas v. American
Code Co. 3 denied taxpayer's deduction for a loss due to breach
of a contract by the taxpayer. The taxpayer (except in the tax
proceeding) was denying and litigating its liability. The Court
found insufficient certainty of liability or amount to permit a
monetary accrual. It is quite clear that the Court did not say that
litigation or all uncertainties of amount would prevent accrual,
for it referred to the fact that the breach of contract or contest-
ing of liability might or might not justify the deduction and
seemed to approve deductions where "the approximate amount of
the damages was reasonably predictable" and "a liability [was]
reasonably estimated."
In Lucas v. N. Texas Lumber Co.3" a ten-day option to buy
real estate was given. On December 30, 1916, the purchaser exer-
cised the option. The deed and other papers were delivered, title
passed and cash was paid on January 5, 1917. The taxpayer
(seller) tried to accrue the sale in 1916. Since there was no tender
of title, possession or demand in 1916 the Court denied there was
a sale or completed transaction. This was really a definition of
"sale" and only incidentally a discussion of accrual. Even then the
decision leaves open the possibility of otherwise showing accrual
based on rights and liabilities. It has been suggested that you must
look to the obligor's (third party's) actions: ". . . unconditional
liability of vendee for the purchase price was not created in that
year." At most, I take this expression as equivalent to saying that
the taxpayer did not have a "right."
Continental Tie and Lumber Co. v. United States85 is a key
case because of its positive and negative limits. A statute in 1920
guaranteed certain income to railroads for 1917-18, during the
period of government operation. Litigation as to whether any, or
how great, payment should be made to this railroad was con-
tinued until 1923, when final determination and payment were
obtained. The Supreme Court required accrual in 1920 because
the liability and amount was then calculable "within reasonable
limits." The litigation did not prevent the accrual. This seems
to establish a rule of reason as to probabilities and amount-litiga-
tion against a government under a statute has high probability.
33 280 U.S. 445 (1930).
34281 U.S. 11 (1930).
35286 U.S. 290 (1932).
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A later case, which goes with this since it allowed accrual though
there was no absolute certainty as to amount, is Gulf, Mobile
and Northern R. Co. v. Helvering 6 A similar expression will be
found in Maryland Casualty Co. v. United States37 in referring
to "claims accrued, but contingent and indefinite as to amount
or time of payment."
The next case, Brown v. Helvering 8 bears a resemblance to
the American Code case. An insurance salesman was denied de-
duction for a reserve against commissions accrued and received,
which commissions might have to be returned in later years on
cancellation of the policies. The Court at one point used the
words, "a liability does not accrue as long as it remains contin-
gent." It is clear from the whole case that the justices considered
the likelihood of cancellation and return too contingent and in-
capable of estimate "within reasonable limits."
Two cases, sometimes cited to show that taxpayer's accrual
depends on the situation of the other party to the transaction are
Spring City Foundry Co. v. Commissione 9 and United States v.
Car Heating & Lighting Co."0 In the Foundry case, a taxpayer
vendor was required to accrue the full sales price in the year
of sale, although the purchaser was insolvent at the time. A full
offsetting deduction for a worthless debt was disallowed since
the debt had a value of 20-25 percent and the statute allowed
deduction only for worthlessness. In the Safety Car case a patent
infringement suit by the holder of the patent was begun in 1912;
in 1915 the validity of its patent was determined. An accounting
for profits was begun and was finally settled in 1925. Taxpayer
attempted to exclude the pre-1913 profits as capitalized by statute
on March 1, 1913. But the Regulations (deemed adopted by re-
enactment of the statute) required that the item must be "uncon-
ditional" to be excluded. The extended litigation and ultimate
settlement for a fraction of the claimed damages was referred to
as negativing the "unconditional" quality. These cases fall far
short of allowing a third party's condition or actions to thwart
sound accrual practices.
In 1944 two similar cases came before the Supreme Court:
3 293 U.S. 295 (1934), affirming (D.C. Cir. 1934) 71 F. (2d) 953.
37251 U.S. 342 at 350 (1920).
38291 U.S. 193 (1934).
39292 U.S. 182 (1934).
40297 U.S. 88 (1936).
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Dixie Pine Products Co. v. Commissioner and Security Flour
Mills Co. v. Commissioner.' In the first case the Mississippi tax-
ing authorities in 1936 determined that the solvent used by the
taxpayer was subject to a gasoline tax. Taxpayer paid the tax
and sued for a refund and to enjoin further collection. In 1937
the Supreme Court of Mississippi, on the pleadings, overruled the
state's demurrer, and recognized that if the plaintiff could prove
its case there would be no tax. Thereupon taxpayer refused to
pay further. On advice of counsel it accrued taxes in 1937. In
1938 and 1939 on an agreed statement of facts the taxpayer suc-
cessfully proved his case and the solvent was held to be not tax-
able. The Supreme Court refused to allow the accrual in 1937
for federal tax purposes, saying:
"It has never been questioned that a taxpayer who accounts
on the accrual basis may, and should, deduct from gross
income a liability which really accrues in the taxable year.
It has long been.held that in order truly to reflect the income
of a given year, all the events must occur in that year which
fix the amount and the fact of the taxpayer's liability for
items of indebtedness deducted though not paid; and this
cannot be the case where the liability is contingent and is con-
tested by the taxpayer. Here the taxpayer was strenuously
contesting liability in the courts and, at the same time, de-
ducting the amount of the tax, on the theory that the state's
exaction constituted a fixed and certain liability. This it
could not do. It must, in the circumstances, await the event
of the state court litigation and might claim a deduction only
for the taxable year in which its liability for the tax was finally
adjudicated.
43
Security Flour Mills likewise denied a taxpayer the right to
accrue processing tax liability in 1935. There the taxpayer had con-
tested liability and the processing tax had been declared unconsti-
tutional the following year. In both cases enough had developed
prior to accrual to make the liability highly unlikely, no liability
finally resulted, and it was the taxpayer who was asserting incon-
sistent positions.
Lewyt Corp. v. Commissioner 44 reaffirmed the Anderson con-
41520 U.S. 516 (1944).
42 521 U.s. 281 (1944).
48 320 U.S. 516 at 519 (1944).
44349 U.S. 237 (1955).
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cept of accruing tax liability in accordance with sound accrual
accounting. Said the Court:
"Finally, the tax that 'accrued' within a given year is not the
tax finally determined to be due but the tax before ultimate
adjustments are made. That is elementary in tax law .... In
short, the amount of tax accrued within the taxable year
under section 122(d)(6) is to be determined in accord with
the normal accounting concepts relevant to the accrual basis.
That amount is not, of course, to be ascertained solely by
reference to the figure set forth in the taxpayer's return, for
that figure may be erroneously computed on the accrual basis.
But when an amount is arrived at by proper application
of recognized accounting principles on the accrual basis, the
test of section 122 (d)(6) has been met. Events and transac-
tions of later years, irrelevant to a determination of income
on the accrual basis, do not warrant alteration of the figure
computed under section 122(d)(6) for the year in question."45
The 1957 Automobile Club of Michigan case must also be added
because of its reference to the Beacon and Schuessler cases which
applied the all-events test to allow sound accrual practices.
By comparison to these United States Supreme Court cases,
the lower court decisions are in almost hopeless confusion and,
with a few noteworthy exceptions, do not embody sound accrual
practices. In 1949 Alfred Holland, in a fairly complete survey
of the cases, could conclude "that this is another instance where
the legal profession has substituted legal technicalities for prin-
ciples of accounting. . . .,4 Mr. Holland catalogued the court
holdings as: (A) Non-accrual where the existence of any liability
is uncertain, which is shown by taxpayer's denial, the other party's
denial, litigation by either party, or by an independent court
examination of the facts, with the uncertainty continuing until
final determination, e.g., by appeal.4 7 (B) Non-accrual where the
liability is subject to a contingency.48 (C) Non-accrual where a
dispute exists as to which of two parties has the right to receive
payment, though the liability to some person is fixed.49 (D)
Accruability of obligation though the amount is uncertain, if
45 Id. at 242-243.
46 48 McH. L. Rxv. 149 at 181 (1949).
471d at 152-159.
48 Id. at 159-161.
49 Id. at 161-165.
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it can be "fixed within reasonable limits."5 (E) Confusion of the
courts as to accrual when collectibility is uncertain, e.g., due to
insolvency."- Although I do not agree with all of the conclusions
or case interpretations, this article was a comprehensive review of
cases. It did not, however, point out all the discrepancies and con-
fusion then existing.52
Since 1949 the lower court cases have tended in two conflict-
ing directions. A series of cases have much more realistically
embodied accrual accounting practices and have found the "all
events" test no hindrance.53 On the other hand further confusion
5Old. at 165-172.
5lId. at 172-180.
52 Contests by third parties had not always prevented accrual, Pittsburgh Hotels Co.
v. United States, 63 Ct. Cl. 475 (1927), cert. den. 275 U.S. 546 (1927). See also the modifica-
tion of the rule of non-accrual during litigation, if money was actually received before
litigation was ended [Board v. Commissioner, (6th Cir. 1931) 51 F. (2d) 73, cert. den. 284
U.S. 658 (1931); Topeka Flour Mills Co., 12 B.T.A. 147 (1928), and cases listed I P-H
1958 FED. TAx SERv. 6302J or money was paid and litigation continued, e.g., Chestnut
Securities Co. v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1945) 62 F. Supp. 574.
The distinction between conditions subsequent and precedent [Brooklyn Union Gas
Co., 22 B.T.A. 507 (1931), affd. 62 F. (2d) 505 (1933); Crossett Timber and Development
Co., 29 B.T.A. 705 (1934); Helvering v. Russian Finance and Construction Corp., (2d Cir.
1935) 77 F. (2d) 324 still persists [Grand Ave. Motor Co. v. United States, (D.C. Minn.
1954) 124 F. Supp. 423].
For inconsistent views on whether "reserves" were non-allowable or could be treated
as accruals, see Houghton &: Dutton Co., 26 B.T.A. 52 (1932), and Willoughby Camera
Stores, Inc. v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1942) 125 F. (2d) 607; Wayne Title and Trust Co.,
16 T.C. 924 (1951), affd. (3d Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 401; Morrison-Ricker Mfg. Co., 2 B.T.A.
1008 (1925); and see also 1 P-H 1958 FED. TAX Saav. I[6437-6449.
In cases involving accrual of compensation to railroad companies during the period
of federal control, back mail pay to railroads, compensation for requisitioning vessels,
and like claims, there has been a split depending on whether the "amount" or the
"liability" was being settled by subsequent litigation or negotiation. 1 P-H 1958 FED.
TAX. Srmy. 116314-6324. See also Wagman, "Sections 452 and 462: Stormy Past But a Bright
Tomorrow," 33 TAxEs 711 at 712 (1955).
53 For example: (I) The recent cases have tended to allow accrual though the amount
is uncertain: Harrold v. Commissioner, (4th Cir. 1951) 192 F. (2d) 1002; Central Cuba
Sugar Co. v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1952) 198 F. (2d) 214; Avco Mfg. Co., 25 T.C. 975
(1956). Taking realistic views of when the amount can be reasonably estimated: Com-
missioner v. Henry Hess Co., (9th Cir. 1954) 210 F. (2d) 553; Boston Elevated Ry. Co.,
16 T.C. 1084 (1951), affd. (1st Cir. 1952) 196 F. (2d) 923.
(2) Contest by the government on the basis of sales over ceiling does not prevent
accrual of sales: National Beverage Laboratories, Inc. v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1953) 116
F. Supp. 724, cert. den. 348 U.S. 815 (1954).
(3) Even taxpayer's continued litigation does not prevent accrual of income. Albin
Johnson, P-H T.C. MEMo. Dac. ff47,057 (1947).
(4) Payment subject to condition (e.g., filing claim, expiration notice period) does
not prevent accrual. Clark v. Woodward Construction Co., (10th Cir. 1950) 179 F. (2d)
176; Roy Moody Bell, P-H T.C. MEMo. Dac. ff53,369 (1953); Cloverleaf Creamery Co. v.
Davis, (D.C. Ala. 1951) 97 F. Supp. 121; Fisher Brown, P-H T.C. MEMo. Dac. ff50,288
(1950).
(5) Although the person to whom the obligation runs is uncertain due to litigation,
accrual is possible. Hershey Creamery Co. v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1952) 101 F. Supp.
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has developed from legalistic logic, particularly as related to dis-
puted items. 4 Some of the detailed and technical distinctions can
be seen from cases during the past year which are summarized
in the Appendix.
The part of the above stated rules and conflicts to which we
should give particular attention are (1) the apparently clear
American rule of non-accrual of contingent liabilities (Mr. Hol-
land's "B"); (2) Mr. Holland's portion of rule "A" above which
prevents accrual, particularly if applied where a person other than
the taxpayer is denying liability or litigating liability; (3) any
treatment which considers accrual of income and expense items
alike and fails to distinguish between situations in which the
taxpayer seeks to accrue or refuses to accrue, and those in which
he asserts, or merely defends against, controversy as to liability;
(4) any rule preventing accrual though the liability is fixed, if
the obligee is uncertain.
(1) It may now be too late, in the light of countless court ex-
pressions to the contrary, to establish a rule that "contingencies"
877; Foster Wheeler Corp., 20 T.C. 15 (1953). It is uncertain that the rule was ever
otherwise as stated above (note 49), Tobin Packing Co., 43 B.T.A. 642 (1941). The recent
cases are sounder accounting.
(6) See the general commendation by accountants and tax lawyers of cases like the
following: Beacon Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, (10th Cir. 1955) 218 F. (2d) 697;
Schuessler v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1956) 230 F. (2d) 722; Pacific Grape Products Co.,
17 T.C. 1097 (1952), revd. (9th Cir. 1955) 219 F. (2d) 862; Patsch v. Commissioner, (3d
Cir. 1953) 208 F. (2d) 532; Harrold v. Commissioner, (4th Cir. 1951) 192 F. (2d) 1002;
Capital Warehouse Co. v. Commissioner, (8th Cir. 1948) 171 F. (2d) 395; Commissioner
v. Gregory Run Coal Co., (4th Cir. 1948) 212 F. (2d) 52; Central Cuba Sugar Co. v. Com-
missioner, (2d Cir. 1952) 198 F. (2d) 214; 17 LA. L. Rxv. 628 at 634 (1957); Sporrer, "The
Past and Future of Deferring Income and Reserving for Expenses," 34 TAXES 45 (1956);
Wagman, "Sections 452 and 462: Stormy Past But a Bright Tomorrow," 33 TAx=s 711
(1955).
54 Rev. Rul. 54-608, 1954-2 Cum. BuL. 8, reversing I.T. 3956, 1949-1 Cum. BuL. 78,
and G.C.M. 25261, 1947-2 Cuss. Bu. 44 (accrual vacation pay).
The conflict as to accruability and non-accruability of liabilities to offset claim-of-right
income has already been noted: S. Loewenstein & Son, 21 T.C. 648 (1954), affd. (6th Cir.
1955) 222 F. (2d) 919; Beacon Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, (10th Cir. 1955) 218 F.
(2d) 697; Schuessler v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1956) 230 F. (2d) 722; Curtis R. Andrews,
23 T.C. 1026 (1955). And fine distinctions as to what was not under claim-of-right: Bates
Motor Transport Lines, Inc., 17 T.C. 151 (1951), affd. (7th Cir. 1952) 200 F. (2d) 20;
Mutual Tel. Co. v. United States, (9th Cir. 1953) 204 F. (2d) 160. Continued distinction
allowing accrual if paid and continue to litigate, but not if no payment: Consolidated
Edison Co. v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1955) 135 F. Supp. 881, cert. den. 351 U.S. 909 (1956).
Continued fiction that renegotiation of contracts, like backpay to transportation
systems, relates to uncertain amount rather than contest of liability (result good): Holmes
Projector Co. v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1952) 105 F. Supp. 690, cert. den. 344 U.S. 912
(1953); Junior Toy Corp. v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1953) 116 F. Supp. 730, cert. den. 348
U.S. 815 (1954). Cf. I.T. 3851, 1947-1 Cum. BuL. 32; Rev. Rul. 169, 1953-2 Cum. BUL. 139;
Rev. Rul. 55-369, 1955-1 Cum. Bur.. 68 (airmail rates).
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may be accrued if they are such that estimate within reasonable
limits is possible. Certainly this rule would be sound accounting.
It is also the rule in England, as shown in a subsequent section of
this paper. Even though my efforts to gain acceptance of the view
that some contingencies may be accrued may go for naught, I feel it
necessary to point out that all the Supreme Court cases could be
harmonized with such rule. If there is a minor or slight contin-
gency, it does not prevent determination within reasonable limits,
and therefore accrual occurs-of liability (Anderson and Lewyt
cases), or of income (American National, Continental Tie, Gulf
M. & N. R.). On the other hand, a substantial contingency prevents
accrual-of liability (American Code, Brown, Dixie Pine and Se-
curity Flour Mills) or of income (N. Texas Lumber). It is possible
to see how this works in the British cases. We do not escape this
same kind of evaluation whatever number of subdivided rules as to
litigation, uncertain amount, or other contingencies we devise.
(2) The above analysis of the Supreme Court cases shows that
I do not believe the test is whether there is continued litigation.
The Court denied accrual when the taxpayer was denying liability
and litigating (American Code, Dixie Pine, Security Flour Mills)
and accrual was required though the taxpayer was continuing to
litigate (Continental Tie). To adopt a rule that if taxpayer liti-
gates a claim in non-tax proceedings he loses his tax right of
accrual is to tell him he must surrender a legal right in order to
gain a tax right. Take two simple examples:
In January 1956 the taxpayer, A, who uses his car in
business, buys a new Chevrolet from B dealer. In December
the car went through a guard rail and was wrecked. B repairs
it and sends A a bill for $350. A refuses to pay all the bill
because he claims the accident occurred from faulty steering
mechanism and faulty maintenance (B did all maintenance
work). A has no proof as to how the accident occurred; the
car simply went out of control. B sues A. A's lawyer tells
him he will probably lose the case.
In January 1956 the taxpayer, A, leases B an apartment
under a year lease. B occupies it for two months, pays no rent,
moves out. A tries but is unable to re-rent it. There are no
defenses to A's action on the lease. B has a good job and is
able to pay. Because B wants to make A trouble he makes A
sue him and asserts a series of "defenses": lack of heat, unten-
antable conditions, that the signature on the lease is not his.
The case is still in litigation at the end of 1956. A's expenses
with regard to the lease have all occurred in 1956.
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Is there any reason why accrual should not be permitted in
either case? In one the taxpayer is denying liability; in the second
the other party makes the denial. In both the taxpayer's liabilities
and rights are as certain as most any other event in business.
Can it be said that when a seller makes a sale it is any more
certain (for the buyer may litigate) than the lease or repair? Yet
the cases without exception require accrual of sales when made.
It seems particularly objectionable to make a taxpayer lose the
consistency of accrual accounting because a third party, who may
be acting from sheer cussedness, challenges his right.
(3) Even if we are to concede that some litigation precludes
accrual, and even if we interpret the Dixie Pine and the Security
Flour Mill cases as holding that the taxpayer must be consistent
in his accounting and civil litigation positions (that he cannot
both assert and deny liability)-a sound logical but an unsound
accounting view-we cannot excuse ourselves from a very dis-
criminating examination of the facts. Are we dealing with an
income or a deduction accrual problem? Does the taxpayer seek
to accrue or resist accrual? If a controversy exists concerning the
liability, is the taxpayer asserting or defending? Is the taxpayer's
position in the tax-accounting problem the same as, or inconsist-
ent with, his civil law stand?
Examine the last of these first, even under the "inconsistent
stand" theory ascribed to the Dixie Pine and the Security Flour
Mills cases. If the taxpayer asserts his right to income and accrues
it while he is suing for it, he is wholly consistent. To prevent
his accruing the income is to allow a third party to govern tax-
payer's books and to cause disharmony with the usual accrual
concept of matching expenses and income. As shown in the next
major section of this article, the result thus reached in some recent
cases is most objectionable.
We have already partially analyzed the problems inherent
in the taxpayer asserting or defending a liability controversy. If
the taxpayer is merely defending and accrual is refused, the initia-
tive has again passed to another to determine the taxpayer's
taxability. Further, to deny accrual is to demand that the tax-
payer surrender either his tax rights or his general legal rights.
Similarly, different considerations should obtain when the
taxpayer seeks to accrue and when he resists accrual. If taxpayer's
books embody a sound accrual system then it should be respected
unless the Commission carries the burden of showing that it does
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not truly reflect income; this is the statutory requirement.55 If
proper accrual procedure requires inclusion and the taxpayer
refuses, then the burden is his to justify this hybrid.
It is to state the obvious to say that different considerations
apply to income and deduction items. Income is all inclusive and
to be reported at the earliest possible time; deductions are a
matter of legislative grace, placing on the taxpayer the burden of
coming within their protection.5 The N. Texas Lumber, Spring
City Foundry and Safety Car Heating are all cases where (even
if accrual were permitted) the accrual would not qualify for the
statutory deduction.
(4) In so far as an obligor recognizes his obligation in the
alternative to the taxpayer or another (Holland's category "C"),
the taxpayer is in a slightly more favorable position than an
obligee as to whom the obligor denied liability, and might come
under the doctrine of contingencies. It is doubtful whether
trustee, receivership and similar cases represent the rule as to
accrual by virtue of uncertainty. The terms of the trust or re-
ceivership determine the rights of the beneficiary, and accrual,
except in accordance with those terms, would be unjustified.57
As to accruals by the taxpayer obligor, it should make no differ-
ence to whom the obligation is payable, and this seems to be
recognized. 8
The Meaning of "Both Sides of the Books Must Be Treated Alike"
We might still be able to operate a reasonable system of ac-
crual accounting, even with the burden of the "claim of right"
and "all factors" tests, but the straw that breaks the camel's back
may be the new emphasis on how the other party to the transac-
tion treats it. Two very recent cases-a Sixth Circuit case59 and
one from the Third Circuit 6°0-illustrate the additional confusion.
The courts have frequently used expressions such as, "Both
sides of the ledger must be treated alike." 1 Most of these com-
55I.R.C., §446.
56 Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590 at 593 (1943); note, Griswold,
"An Argument Against the Doctrine That Deductions Should Be Narrowly Construed
as a Matter of Legislative Grace," 56 HAxv. L. REv. 1142 (1943).
57 Cases cited in Holland, "Accrual Problems in Tax Accounting," 48 MicH. L. Rv.
149 at 162-164 (1949).
58 Tobin Packing Co., 43 B.T.A. 642 (1941); Foster Wheeler Corp., 20 T.C. 15 (1953);
Hershey Creamery Co. v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1952) 101 F. Supp. 877.
59 Cold Metal Process Co. v. Commissioner, (6th Cir. 1957) 247 F. (2d) 864.
60 Irwin v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1956) 238 F. (2d) 874.
61 Ohmer Register Co. v. Commissioner, (6th Cir. 1942) 131 F. (2d) 682; Bonded
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ments were for the purpose of requiring tax accounting to con-
form to the business accounting concept that expenses attribut-
able to income items should be deducted in the same period as
the report of income.2 Until recently this had not generally been
taken to prevent a taxpayer from accruing an item merely be-
cause a third party contested liability. It is true that in some cases
where a third party contested liability the courts had previously
found sufficient uncertainty to disallow accrual. 63 Now the rule
appears, not as a matter of degree but as one of preclusion, in
the Cold Metal Process case, and particularly in Irwin v. Com-
missioner. In the Cold Metal Process case the taxpayer was sole
stockholder in dissolution of a corporation which had owned
patents for hot and cold rolling of metals. These patents had
been infringed, but from 1943 to 1949 the government was suing
to cancel them. The court held that infringement royalties paid
into court from 1943 to 1949 could not be accrued prior to 1949.
The court put the decision on the basis that the amount "was
not accruable ... because of litigation instituted by the Govern-
ment which strenuously contested the legal right of the corpora-
tion to such income until the termination of the litigation in
1949." But the case may actually be viewed as one in which the
taxpayer was not clear in its own accrual, because the taxpayer had
previously defeated an attempted government accrual in 1945
by asserting that the income was not accruable while challenged."
No such extenuation can be found in the Irwin case. There
the taxpayer entered into a contract with the United States to
build Howard University library. The contract contained a
clause providing for liquidated damages in case of delay. A loss
occurred by reason of governmental delay. On the completion
of the contract the builder accrued damages of $25,700 ($100 for
257 days). In 1946 an award of about $13,000 was made and the
Mortgage Co. v. Commissioner, (4th Cir. 1934) 70 F. (2d) 341. These expressions have
been for the purpose of saying that income should not be accrued and expenses re-
ported on a cash basis or vice versa, e.g., Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333
U.S. 496 at 501 (1948), and Air-Way Electric Appliance Corp. v. Guitteau, (6th Cir. 1941)
123 F. (2d) 20. It is also true that some cases have referred arguendo to the fact that
"both the petitioner and its agents have treated [the agents'] commissions as earned and
as definite obligations .. " Ohmer Register Co., supra this note, at 686.
62 United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422 (1926); Security Flour Mills Co. v. Com-
missioner, 321 U.S. 281 (1944); American National Co. v. United States, 274 U.S. 99 (1927);
and notes 4-9 supra.
65American Hotels Corp., 46 B.T.A. 629 (1924); Ky. and Ind. Term. Ry. Co. v.
Commissioner, (6th Cir. 1931) 54 F. (2d) 738, cert. den. 286 U.S. 557 (1932).
64 Cold Metal Process Co. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 916 (1951).
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taxpayer claimed a loss equal to the over-accrual of 1938. The
court seemed to hold that there should have been no accrual in
1938. It is difficult to state the rationale of the court. It might be
(1) "The claim for this item was presented to the government for
the first time in June or July of 1939," (2) "the partnership in
1940 brought an action in the Court of Claims for an amount
in excess of $40,000," (3) "the accrual of $25,700 in 1938 was im-
proper because it was extremely uncertain," (4) "Whatever right
the partnership had, or whatever liability the government had,
is based not upon any specific contractual clause [note: this is
factually questionable], but rather upon the breach of that con-
tract.... Such rights or liabilities must normally be determined
either by a settlement between the parties or by judicial decision."
(5) "This case does not fall within the principles of Continental
Tie.... The difference between that case and the one under con-
sideration is what Judge Learned Hand called the distinction be-
tween the liquidation of a determined right, and the determina-
tion of a disputed right." Actually it was necessary only to decide
that the over-accrual in 1938 could not be deducted in 1946.
Whatever the court's reasoning, the assertion of non-liability by
the government has prevented the taxpayer from following sound
accounting practices though a later decision has shown the tax-
payer right as to liability (though erroneous as to amount). This
case should not stand. A taxpayer should, with the guidance of his
lawyer, be, able to make a reasonable estimate of his chances for
income and the amount. The court seems to recognize this in
the distinction between contract rights and contract breach. This
goes to the degree of certainty. Mere assertion of non-liability by a
third party should not be the deciding factor.
The British Attitude on Accruing Contingencies
It may be pointed out categorically that Britain has no such
difficulty in making its accounting and tax accrual processes con-
sistent. The courts have uniformly held that a contingency does
not relieve a taxpayer of accruing either income or expense.
Whether the contingency attaches to a right to earnings or to a
liability, the right or the liability must be valued and accounted
for year by year before the resolution of the contingency. This
can be illustrated by three House of Lords cases, the latest decided
in 1956: Sun Ins. Office v. Clark, 5 Harrison v. Cronk & Sons,
65 [1912] A.C. 443.
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Ltd.,"6 and Southern Ry. of Peru, Ltd. v. Owen.67 In the Sun case
the court permitted a fire insurance company to deduct against
annual premiums received an estimate to meet later fire damage
claims. It recognized that these fire claims were completely con-
tingent and might never occur, but that an actuarial computation
of experience in fire risks was possible. The Harrison case in-
volved deposits by building contractors with lending societies.
The deposits might be forfeited if the house purchasers failed to
make their payments. In spite of the contingency that the con-
tractor might never receive the deposits, the court required that
they be accrued on an actuarial basis taking account of the con-
tingency. Finally, in the Peru case, an English company operating
a railway in Peru was required by Peruvian law to pay a retire-
ment pension to employees equal to the monthly wage times
years of service. But this employee right could be lost by insub-
ordination or other wrongful acts. The liability was therefore both
deferred and contingent. Nevertheless, the court recognized that
the liability should be accrued year by year, the only question
being the method of Valuing. The House of Lords rejected the
Crown's argument to defer accrual until actual payment because
of the contingency; it also rejected the company's plan to take
the annual wage plus an additional month. The statement of
Lord Radcliffe may be taken as typical of the English view:
"But, whatever the legal analysis, I think that for liabili-
ties as for debts their proper treatment in annual statements
of profit depends not on the legal form but on the trader's
answers to two separate questions. The first is-Have I ade-
quately stated my profits for the year if I do not include some
figure in respect of these obligations? The second is-Do the
circumstances of the case, which include the techniques of
established accounting practice, make it possible to supply a
figure reliable enough for the purpose?" 8
Repeal of I.R.C. Sections 452 and 462
Reference has been made elsewhere in this paper, 9 and other
law review articles70 have developed this beyond the necessity
66 [1936] All E.R. 747.
67 [1956] 2 All E.R. 728.
68 Id. at 739.
69 Note 9 supra.
7017 LA. L. REV. 628 at 633 (1957); Sporrer, "The Past and Future of Deferring
Income and Reserving for Expenses," 34 TAXES 45 at 56 (1956); Wagman, "Section 452
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for further documentation here, that the statutes and the regula-
tions early encouraged sound accrual practices. It was only be-
cause the cases seemed to reverse this policy and produce con-
fusion that sections 452 and 462 were embodied in the 1954 In-
ternal Reirenue Code. When it was feared that these provisions
would permit tax escape in one year beyond the normal expecta-
tions of accrual accounting, the sections were retroactively re-
pealed.71 The proposed regulations under the sections embodied
sound accrual accounting. As pointed out before, the repeal was
to close the door to double deductions and too large adjustments
in one year, and not to thwart sound accounting or reverse the
trend to bring tax law and accounting into harmony.
The congressional committee considering repeal commended
certain liberal accrual cases and expressed the hope that the courts
might accomplish the legitimate purposes of sections 452 and 462
by application of these cases. 2 It must be admitted that there are
arguments in favor of a case-to-case approval of sound accruing,
rather than through the wide open invitation of section 462. Be-
cause of the committee's reliance on Pacific Grape Products Co.
v. Commissionere3 that case takes on peculiar significance. There-
in, a canner's season or "pack" extended from July 1st to Novem-
ber 1st. It sold its products under a contract that completed a sale
before December 31st and caused all unshipped goods to be billed
on that day. It accrued income from all these sales by December
31st and accrued expenses relating to each sale for brokerage fees,
labeling, packing and shipping. The Court found the customs of
the industry supported this practice, that the system had been
followed consistently by the taxpayer for many years, and that
"these expenses were either precisely known or determinable with
extreme accuracy." It therefore considered that the Supreme
Court's Anderson decision controlled: that the purpose of the tax
law accounting provision "was to enable taxpayers to keep their
books and make their returns according to scientific accounting
principles, by charging against income earned during the taxable
period, the expenses incurred in and properly attributable to the
process of earning income during that period."
and 462; Stormy Past But a Bright Tomorrow," 33 TAxEs 711 at 716 (1955); 9 ALA. L.
Rav. 143 at 147 (1956); 85 TAxEs 782 at 791 (1957).
7169 Stat. 134 (1955), 26 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1957) §§452, 462; Rev. Rul. 55-539, 1955-2
Cum. BuL. 246.
72 See note 9 supra.
73 (9th Cir. 1955) 219 F. (2d) 862.
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And thus we have come full circle-from the legislative decla-
ration that sound accrual practices were to be followed, which
was accepted in the Anderson case as the proper test, back to a
commendation by the legislative committee of those cases which
continue to apply this simple policy.
Guiding Principles
The following guiding principles seem to be developed by
the better reasoned cases, by sound accrual acounting and by the
legislature's basic policy:
1. Tax decisions should aim to allow accrual accounting suffi-
cient leeway to accomplish the basic purpose of charging the ex-
penses related to the production of income to the same period as
that of income production.
2. Accrual is an accounting for reasonable expectancies, and
the reasonableness of the expectancy should govern its accrual and
allowance. This is essentially a fact, rather than a law, question.
3. It is proper to employ the "claim of right" test to tax income
at least as early as it is received in unrestricted funds, provided
that offsetting accruals of reasonably ascertainable liabilities or
expenses relating to this earning process be allowed at the same
time.
4. The "all events" test was intended, and can be made, to
prevent unsound income or expense reporting by insisting that
all events required by sound accrual accounting have occurred
and cannot be disregarded.
5. The test was not, and should not be, a catalogue of abso-
lutes which must be met before accruing can occur. Accruing re-
mains a concept of "reasonably predictable" and "reasonably es-
timated" and it must be allowed to operate "within reasonable
limits."
6. The point at which the courts have gone farthest away from
the original concept is in the demand for the "absolute" of admit-
ted liability.
7. It is submitted that a reasonably certain right or liability
is all that need be required for accrual.
8. In no event should the fact, as such, that a third party de-
nies or litigates liability, prevent a taxpayer from accruing a rea-
sonably certain right or liability.
9. The fact, as such, that the taxpayer takes inconsistent posi-
tions as to liability in civil lawsuits and on his own books and tax
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returns should not be the basis for denying accrual. It may be a
factor, with other evidence, to show lack of "reasonable pre-
dictability."
10. These rules would approach the British system while per-
haps not openly accruing contingencies.
11. Accrual cannot excuse the necessity for proving that the lia-
bility comes within one of the legislatively granted deduction
categories. No accounting system sets up its own tax law; it merely
reflects the timing of items. It answers the question of "when,"
not "whether."
12. The Cold Metal Process and Irwin theories which make
the actions and intent of others govern the taxpayer's accounting
and tax reporting should be abandoned.
APPENDIX
Claim of Right Cases
Automobile Club of Michigan v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957).
Membership dues paid in advance for one year must be accrued at once
rather than over twelve-month period.
Irwin v. Commissioner, (3d Cir. 1956) 238 F. (2d) 874. Contractor not
allowed to accrue liquidated damages for delay in construction because
government was contesting liability.
Cold Metal Process Co. v. Commissioner, (6th Cir. 1957) 247 F. (2d) 864,
stating same rule as to income challenged in patent litigation.
New Capital Hotel, 28 T.C. No. 77 (1957); Jack Shaucet, 1957 P-H T.C.
Memo. Dec. 57,133. Prepaid rentals income to accrual taxpayer when
received rather than when later earned.
Bressner Radio Inc., 28 T.C. No. 40 (1957). Television Service Company
must accrue payments when received without offsetting accrual of later
services. But liability to another company taking over service contract
properly accrued.
Phillips v. Commissioner, (7th Cir. 1956) 238 F. (2d) 473. Attorney
required to accrue income received as contingent fee, though case later
reversed and fee to be paid back.
Lee McRitchie, 27 T.C. 65 (1956). Dividend declared on stock
involved in title litigation cannot be accrued until released from litigation.
Thalhimer Bros., Inc., 27 T.C. 733 (1957). Insurance proceeds
not accruable as income until actual receipt where amount disputed.
Charles M. Kilborn, 29 T.C. No. 14 (1957); Arthur V. Morgan, 29
T.C. No. 9 (1957); Clifton E. Baird, 1957 P-H T.C. Memo. Dec. 57,-
192; J. H. Schaeffer, Jr., 1957 P-H T.C. Memo. Dec. 57,068; Burl P.
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Glover, 1957 P-H T.C. Memo. Dec. 57,045; West Pontiac, Inc., 27 T.C. 749
(1957); Texas Trailercoach, Inc., 27 T.C. 575 (1956); Albert M.
Brodsky, 27 T.C. No. 23 (1956). Accrual income credited by financing
companies to dealer reserve account shall be accrued at date of credit,
without offsetting estimated liability, rather than when paid over. But see
Texas Trailercoach v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1958) 1 Am. Fed. Tax Rep.
(2d) 58-533; Johnson v. Commissioner, (4th Cir. 1958) 233 F. (2d) 952;
West Pontiac, Inc. v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1958) 1 Am. Fed. Tax Rep.
(2d) 58-839; Hines Pontiac, Inc. v. United States, (N.D. Tex. 1957) 1 Am.
Fed. Tax Rep. (2d) 58-734; Modem Olds, Inc. v. United States, (N.D.
Tex. 1957) 1 Am. Fed. Tax Rep. (2d) 58-732.
N. Gordon Phillips, 29 T.C. No. 7 (1957). Taxpayer taxed with income
from sale of stock in year of sale though compelled to pay back part in
a subsequent year.
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Edwards, (D.C. Ga. 1957) 150 F. Supp. 589.
Airline required to accrue full income for transporting mail in year of
service rather than later year when retroactive rates determined and in-
come received.
Cappel House Furnishing Co. v. United States, (6th Cir. 1957) 244 F.
(2d) 525. Accrual taxpayer to accrue business interruption insurance over
period of interruption rather than earlier year of receipt.
Advertisers Exchange, Inc. v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1957) 240 F. (2d)
958. Change from accruing income when contracts signed to period over
which services to be performed could be used but required commissioner's
approval.
H. J. Heinz Co. v. Granger, (W.D. Pa. 1956) 147 F. Supp. 664. Vegetable
canning corporation should accrue government subsidies in later year
when government determines qualification for subsidies rather than year
of sale.
Peters v. United States, (S.D. Cal. 1958) 1 Am. Fed. Tax Rep. (2d) 58-956.
All Events Test
Schuessler v. Commissioner, (5th Cir. 1956) 230 F. (2d) 722. Deduction
for estimated expense of servicing furnaces over five-year period from
date of sale allowed.
Rev. Rul. 57-105, INT. REv. But.. 1957-11. Additional state taxes said
to accrue for federal tax purposes when determined by litigation or by
acknowledgment by taxpayer.
Columbus and So. Ohio Electric Co. v. Commissioner, (6th Cir. 1957)
244 F. (2d) 79. Public utility could accrue liability to refund excess charges
fixed by city though not final until state commission action.
Rev. Rul. 57-485, INT. REv. Bu . 1957-43. Expense accrual, for per-
sonal injury claims unsettled at end of year, not deductible.
Rev. Rul. 57-332, INT. REv. BUL. 1957-29. 'Fraud penalties must be
750 MICHIGAN LAW RE iEW [Vol. 56
accrued in year return, giving rise to penalties, is filed rather than when
later assessed.
Guardian Investment Co. v. Phinney, (5th Cir. 1958) 1 Am. Fed. Tax
Rep. (2d) 58-1124.
Messer Oil Corp., 28 T.C. No. 124 (1957). Real estate taxes accruable
when they become a lien rather than in prior year of levy (changed by
1954 code).
Robert S. Bassett, 26 T.C. 619 (1956). Deduction of medical expenses
"deposits" denied on the ground there was no present liability.
Waldheim Realty and Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, (8th Cir. 1957) 245
F. (2d) 823. Allowed deduction of prepaid expenses.
Estate of Bertha V. Nottingham, Docket Nos. 42874, 42875, 1956
P-H T.C. Memo. Dec. 56,281. Amount accrued under profit sharing plan
allowed though erroneously over-computed, but not where liability was
contested by taxpayer. Cf. salesman's commissions pending dispute as
to amount.
Bessie Rand, 1957 P-H T.C. Memo. Dec. 57,132. Cannot accrue legal
and audit expenses contingent on reduction of deficiencies while tax
controversy undetermined.
Rex Sorensen, 1956 P-H T.C. Memo. Dec. 56,234. Taxpayer con-
tracted to supply lumber to government. Defaulted. Taxpayer denied
liability and therefore could not accrue until liability determined.
Emanuel N. Kolkey, 27 T.C. 37 (1956). Interest deduction on taxes
not accruable where tax liability not conceded.
James J. Standing, 28 T.C. No. 88 (1957). Can accrue interest on
deficiencies and attorney's fee in year tax liability settled.
Eugene Richardson, 1957 P-H T.C. Memo. Dec. 57,122. Accounting
fee accruable only when liability fixed and not contingent.
Natco Corp. v. United States, (3d Cir. 1956) 240 F. (2d) 398. Interest
on debentures not deductible in year of payment since liability fixed in
prior years though payment date deferred.
Brainard Steel Corp. v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1956) 146 F. Supp. 461.
Cannot accrue back wages increase subsequently paid, where no liability
but to negotiate.
Landers, Frary and Clark v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 1957) 149 F. Supp.
202. May accrue taxes when taxpayer recognizes liability even though
commissioner or taxpayer subsequently contested amount of liability.
American Bemberg Corp. v. United States, (D.C. Del. 1957) 150 F.
Supp. 355, affd. (3d Cir. 1958) 1 Am. Fed. Tax Rep. (2d) 58-1133. Texas
Mexican Ry. Co. v. United States, (S.D. Tex. 1958) 1 Am. Fed. Tax Rep.
(2d) 58-843; Continental Foundry and Machine Co. v. United States, (Ct. Cl.
1958) 1 Am. Fed. Tax Rep. (2d) 58-1053. Interest liability while contingent
not accruable, but fully accrued when liability determined.
